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I.

INTRODUCTION

O

n May 14, 2022, the G7 group of industrialized nations met to devise a
plan to ensure the export of Ukrainian grain to avert a global hunger crisis. 1
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has created cascading effects on the region and
the world; not least is the impact on food security. Russia is the world’s top
wheat exporter, accounting for 17 percent; Ukraine is fifth, at 8 percent. (The
United States is second at 14 percent). 2 The war has disrupted the flow of
exports from Ukraine as Russia’s attacks have stymied Ukrainian exports by
sea. Before the invasion, Ukraine’s Black Sea ports accounted for 95 percent
of its exports of grain and oil seeds, such as sunflower oil. 3 Russian exports
are also down. 4 Thirty-six countries in the world import more than 50 percent of their wheat from Ukraine and Russia. 5
Could a humanitarian corridor in the Black Sea open the spigot to get
Ukrainian grain to global markets? 6 Some U.S. lawmakers think so, and the
idea raises interesting issues in the law of naval warfare. While Russia may
lawfully impose a blockade on Ukraine, neutral States are entitled to continue
noncontraband trade with Ukraine. In this balance, does Russia’s right to
employ a lawful method of warfare trump the rights of neutral States to trade

1. Guy Chazan, G7 Warns of Global Hunger Crisis Unless Russia Lifts Ukraine Blockade,
FINANCIAL TIMES (May 14, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/2d76bbe5-1163-473b82cf-c327f3672134.
2. Press Release, Global Food Security Consequences of Russia’s War of Aggression
Against Ukraine: G7 Foreign Ministers’ Commitments, GOV.UK (May 14, 2022),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/commitments-on-the-global-food-security-consequences-of-russias-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-g7-foreign-ministers-may-2022;
Daniel Workman, Wheat Exports by Country, WORLD’S TOP EXPORTS,
https://www.worldstopexports.com/wheat-exports-country/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2022).
3. William Mauldin, U.N. Seeks to Ease Russian Blockade of Ukraine Grain Shipping to Avert
Food Shortages, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 16, 2022 3:05 PM EST),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-seeks-to-ease-russian-blockade-of-ukraine-grain-shipping-to-avert-food-shortages-11652717161?page=1.
4. See U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, G7: FAO Puts Forward Proposals to Address Current and Future Food Shortages (May 13, 2022), https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/g7-fao-food-shortages-agriculture-ukraine-russia-germany/en.
5. U.N. GLOBAL CRISIS RESPONSE GROUP, BRIEF NO. 1: GLOBAL IMPACT OF WAR IN
UKRAINE ON FOOD, ENERGY AND FINANCE SYSTEMS 8 (Apr. 13, 2022),
https://news.un.org/pages/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/UN-GCRG-Brief-1.pdf.
6. See generally Eddy Wax, E.U. Plans to Help Ukraine’s Food Exports Dodge Black Sea Blockade, POLITICO (May 10, 2022, 10:13 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-plans-toboost-ukraines-food-exports-black-sea-blockade/.
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with a belligerent? Probably so. While neutral States have a right to continue
noncontraband trade, at sea that right inures to neutral flagged vessels and
neutral goods but does not guarantee access to belligerent markets. Under
the Paris Declaration of 1856, which is accepted as customary law, a neutral
flag covers or protects enemy goods from capture (Article 2) and neutral
goods may not be seized even if they are carried on enemy merchant ships
(Article 3). 7
II.

IMPENDING FOOD CRISIS

Some twenty-five million tons of grain are held up in Ukrainian ports,
penned in by Russia’s de facto blockade. Wheat futures are up 50 percent
this year as Ukraine’s normal export of five to six million tons per month
has been reduced to just one million tons in April. 8 Ukraine is also a major
exporter of corn (16 percent of world exports) and sunflower oil (42 percent
of world exports). 9 Like all commodities—including oil—grain trades on the
margin, so a small shortage in supply has outsized effects on markets, sending prices soaring. Wheat futures contracts, already increasing due to systemic inflation, had climbed 63 percent in the three months from mid-February to mid-May.
Food security for forty-five million people, mostly in Africa and the Middle East, is now at risk. In response, India, the largest grain exporter, banned
shipments abroad to ensure supply for itself and neighboring States. 10 With
grain exports from Ukraine and now India at a standstill, Egypt, Turkey, and
Lebanon could be particularly hard hit, while the situation for Eritrea, Somalia, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Pakistan is dire. 11 Over land routes are insufficient. Getting Ukrainian grain to a port on the Baltic, such as Gdańsk
7. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, 15 MAR(ser. 1) 791, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA89 (1907).
8. Wax, supra note 6.
9. Hannah Ritchie, How Could the War in Ukraine Impact Global Food Supplies?, OUR
WORLD IN DATA (Mar. 24, 2022), https://ourworldindata.org/ukraine-russiafood#:~:text=Ukraine%20and%20Russia%20both%20play,the%20world's%20dominant
%20vegetable%20oils.
10. Gerry Shih & Niha Masih, India Bans Wheat Exports Amid Soaring Global Prices, WASHINGTON POST (May 14, 2022, 3:53 AM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/2022/05/14/india-wheat-ban-ukraine/.
11. See Qu Dongyu, Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, Presentation at the Meeting of the G7 Ministers of Agriculture: Securing
TENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL
TIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT
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and Gdynia, is slow and expensive. 12 The EU is focusing on developing alternative overland routes. 13 But opening Ukrainian ports is the only realistic
option to maintain the volume of grain, as ground transportation infrastructure—rail and truck—cannot accommodate the volume. 14
As the G7 scrambles to consider an overland route, the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) is concerned about the next shoe to drop.
In July and August, Ukraine was expected to harvest the summer crop of
wheat, barley, and corn, including fourteen million tons of grain. The country lacks storage capacity and all that food is destined to go to waste while
some of the least developed countries face severe shortages of food. To
make matters worse, there is evidence that Russia is attacking Ukrainian
grain storage infrastructure. 15 Russia also is reportedly stealing Ukrainian
grain. 16
FAO’s deputy director for markets and trade, Josef Schmidhuber, said
there is enough grain to feed the world, but Russia’s blockade is hampering
the movement to where it is needed most. 17 “It is an almost grotesque situation that we see at the moment,” he said. 18 “In Ukraine, there are nearly 25
million tons of grain that could be exported but they cannot leave the country simply because of the lack of infrastructure and the blockade of the ports.
At the same time . . . there is no wheat corridor opening up for exports from
Ukraine.” 19

Global Food Security in Times of Crisis (May 13, 2022), https://www.fao.org/3/cc01
40en/cc0140en.pdf.
12. See Wax, supra note 6.
13. Id.
14. See Sarah Anne Aarup et al., Ukraine Says E.U. Road Links Won’t Make Up For Loss
of Black Sea Trade, POLITICO (Apr. 5, 2022, 6:37 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/green-corridor-west-not-save-ukraine-trade/.
15. See Steve Holland & Michelle Nichols, Photos Show Russian Attacks on Ukraine Grain
Storage—U.S. Official, REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2022, 12:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
world/exclusive-photos-show-russian-attacks-ukraine-grain-storage-us-official-2022-0401/.
16. Holly Ellyatt et al., Ukraine Warns Countries About Buying Its Stolen Grain; U.S. $40
Billion Aid to Ukraine Faces Delay, CNBC (May 13, 2022, 3:08 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/12/russia-ukraine-live-updates.html.
17. Lisa Schlein, Russian Blockade of Ukrainian Sea Ports Sends Food Prices Soaring, VOA
(May 7, 2022, 12:07 PM), https://www.voanews.com/a/russian-blockade-of-ukrainian-seaports-sends-food-prices-soaring/6561914.html.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Odessa is the last Ukrainian port available to export grain. While the
brutal siege on Mariupol on the Sea of Azov has received widespread attention, Russia continues to press an unremitting naval assault against Odessa
near the Romanian border. The Russian operation appears to be aimed
at converting Ukraine into a land-locked State by cutting access to the Sea of
Azov and the Black Sea. 20 This would connect Russia proper and Russianoccupied eastern Ukraine and Crimea to Transnistria, a pro-Moscow region
of Moldova.
To achieve its goals, when Moscow began the current phase of the war
in Ukraine it announced on February 25 a restriction on vessel access in
northwest Black Sea, north of 45° 21’. 21 That same day, the Cabinet Ministers
of Ukraine issued Order No. 9183-r, closing the country’s ports to entry and
exit as a defensive wartime measure. 22 Lloyd’s Joint War Committee
has warned vessels to avoid an area stretching from the Romanian-Ukraine
border to the Georgia-Russia border in the Black Sea—virtually the entire
coastal area except Turkey. 23
III.

RUSSIA’S BLOCKADE

While Russia has declared a “restricted zone” that is tantamount to an exclusion zone, some are calling it a “blockade.” Maritime exclusion zones are a
lawful method of warfare if they are used to warn merchant and neutral shipping of the hazards inherent in conflict at sea and as a tool to help identify
and sort shipping. As my colleague Pete Pedrozo concluded, the same rules
20. See Elena Becatoros & Jon Gambrell, Russia Pummels Port of Odesa in Attempt to Disrupt
Supplies, AP NEWS (May 10, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-business-nato-moscow-c8e00f7bbc4f24aa40d70a4ac2d97adb.
21. E-mail from Duty Officer, Navigational Warning Service, Russian Department of
Navigation and Oceanography to Navigational Hydrographic Information Center (Feb. 25,
2022), available at https://gcaptain.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Russian-gmdsswarning.jpg (last visited Aug. 31, 2022).
22. IMO, Circular Letter No. 4518, Communication from the Government of Ukraine
(Feb. 24, 2022), https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/
Documents/Black%20Sea%20and%20Sea%20of%20Azov%20-%20Member%20States%
20and%20Associate%20Members%20Communications/Circular%20Letter%20No.4518
%20-%20Communication%20From%20The%20Government%20Of%20Ukraine%20
(Secretariat).pdf.
23. See Lloyd’s Market Association Joint War Committee, Circular No. JWLA-030 (Apr.
4, 2022), available at https://www.lmalloyds.com/lma/jointwar (scroll down to JWLA-030Russia).
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from the law of naval warfare apply inside the zone as outside the zone. 24
Whether Russia’s actions are tantamount to a blockade is a matter of fact
and law. In practice, Russia’s operations look somewhat like a blockade, but
the constitutive elements of blockade have not been fulfilled.
As a form of economic warfare, naval blockade of enemy ports seeks to
sever sea lines of communication and maritime trade between the coastal
State and the rest of the world. Although Russia has imposed restrictions in
the Black Sea to prevent the entry or exit of ships from Ukraine, it has not
fulfilled the legal elements to perfect a de jure blockade. The rules governing
blockade are codified in the London Declaration of 1909. 25 Blockades are
confined to the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy. 26
Notification and declaration of blockade is required to place all States on
notice. 27 The belligerent imposing the blockade must communicate the date
the order begins, the geographic limits of the coastline subject to the order,
and the period of time within which neutrals may exist in the area. 28
To be legally binding, a blockade must be effective, which means the
belligerent forces must be sufficient to prevent access to the enemy coastline. 29 Effectiveness is a question of fact to be determined by a factfinder,
such as a prize court or other adjudicatory tribunal. Blockades also must be
applied impartially among flags of all nations. 30 Warships and neutral vessels
in distress may enter and leave a blockaded area. 31 Although the London
Declaration never entered into force, its provisions have been observed during armed conflict and it is generally regarded as customary international
law. 32
Like “Operation Pocket Money,” the American blockade against Haiphong in May 1972, Russia does not refer to its Black Sea zone as a “block-

24. See Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Maritime Exclusion Zones in Armed Conflicts, ARTICLES OF
WAR (Apr. 12, 2022), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/maritime-exclusion-zones-armed-conflicts/.
25. Declaration Concerning the Laws of Maritime War, Feb. 26, 1909, 208 Consol. T.S.
338, reprinted in THE DECLARATION OF LONDON, FEBRUARY 26, 1909, at 112 (James B.
Scott ed., 1919).
26. Id. art. 1.
27. Id. arts. 8, 10–11.
28. Id. arts. 9–12.
29. Id. art. 2.
30. Id. art. 5.
31. Id. arts. 6–7.
32. See Robert W. Tucker, Blockade, 50 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 283, 285 (1955).
554

Neutral State Access to Ukraine’s Food Exports

Vol. 99

ade” but its restriction regime and enforcement operations appear indistinguishable to a blockade. 33 While blockade is a lawful method of warfare,
Russia’s declaration that ships inside the restricted area “would be regarded
as a terrorist threat” 34 and Russian attacks on Ukrainian and neutral merchant ships 35 violate the proscriptions in the law of naval warfare in so far as
the vessels apparently were not engaged in the conflict or attempting to
breach the blockade. 36 Neutral ships are exempt from capture or attack, and
Ukrainian ships as civilian objects are exempt from attack unless they support the Ukrainian war effort or resist prize capture.
IV.

OPENING UKRAINIAN PORTS

At its meeting on May 14, the G7 Foreign Ministers stated they would support Ukraine in maintaining its agricultural production, storage, and resumption of exports. 37 David Beasley, who heads the World Food Program,
stated, “The bottom line is, if those ports are not opened up, it’s going to
devastate millions of people around the world.” 38 “Millions of people around
the world will die because these ports are being blocked,” he told CNN. 39
Ukraine currently cannot protect Odessa port operations or the onloading of ships. Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelensky is therefore seeking
more military aid, including Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles, to protect the
port and resume normal operations in order to export twelve million tons of

33. See generally Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, Address to the Nation
(May 8, 1972), reprinted in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM 472–73 (7th rev. ed. 1974).
34. E-mail from Duty Officer, supra note 21.
35. See Nick Blenkey, Russian Attacks on Merchant Ships Reported, MARINELOG (Feb. 28,
2022), https://www.marinelog.com/legal-safety/shipping/video-russian-attacks-on-merchant-ships-reported%EF%BF%BC/.
36. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 1110B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS ¶¶ 7.10, 8.6.2.2 (2022).
37. Press Release, supra note 2.
38. Meredith Lee, Urgency Mounts for U.S. Answer to Russian Blockade, POLITICO (May 11,
2022, 2:00 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/11/ukraine-russian-blockadeglobal-food-supplies-00031760.
39. Nicholas Cecil, U.N. Chief Tells Putin: “Open Black Sea Ports, If You Have Any Heart
For Rest of World,” EVENING STANDARD (May 14, 2022), https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/russia-blockade-black-sea-ports-food-world-hunger-united-nations
-david-beasley-b999846.html.
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agricultural product that will spoil by this fall. 40 NATO is unwilling to provide a naval force to help even if it could convince Turkey to lift the ban on
foreign warships in the Black Sea. 41
On March 3, the International Maritime Organization also proposed establishment of “Blue Safe Maritime Corridors” to give safe passage to
some one hundred merchant ships and seafarers stranded in the war zone. 42
Russia agreed but Ukraine has not responded to this call. Alternatively, President Zelensky has suggested that opening humanitarian maritime corridors
from Odessa is the only way to avert the pending grain shortage. U.S. Representative Jason Crow, among others, agrees that reestablishing port operation in the war zone is essential. 43 These leaders propose a twenty-mile
buffer zone between Romania and Turkey through which ships carrying
grain could hug the coast. 44 Ukraine cannot protect Odessa port operations
or the onloading of ships, however, so the vessels must either obtain Russian
clearance or assume the risk.
V.

CONCLUSION

The importance of Ukrainian agricultural trade to other States and the global
market means that in the present conflict there are millions of people dependent on the belligerent State to meet their nutritional needs. While
Ukrainians suffer during the present conflict, the harm from Russia’s invasion is spilling over to States dependent on Ukrainian grain and other food
commodities. Neutral States not party to the conflict rely on Ukraine, a belligerent under blockade-like conditions, to fulfill their requirements for adequate food. The inability of Ukraine to export its agriculture presents a case
of first impression in international humanitarian law.

40. See Lee, supra note 38.
41. See James Kraska, Can Turkey Legally Close Its Straits to Russian Warships? It’s Complicated, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 1, 2022, 4:57 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/
03/01/turkey-black-sea-straits-russia-ships-ukraine-war/.
42. See IMO, IMO Council Decisions on Black Sea and Sea of Azov Situation (Mar. 11, 2022),
https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/ECSStatement.aspx; Jonathan Saul, U.N. to Work on Safe Corridor for Ships Stranded by Ukraine Conflict, REUTERS (Mar.
11, 2022, 7:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/un-work-safe-corridor-ships
-stranded-by-ukraine-conflict-2022-03-12/.
43. See Lee, supra note 38.
44. See Id.
556

Neutral State Access to Ukraine’s Food Exports

Vol. 99

While it is unlawful to starve an enemy population, starvation of enemy
armed forces is not prohibited. 45 Generally, international humanitarian law
requires belligerents to take various affirmative steps to protect the food
supply upon which enemy civilians depend, and to provide food in specific
circumstances. For example, food must be provided to detainees, 46 prisoners
of war, 47 and internees. 48 Occupying powers also have a duty to ensure the
provision of food to the population, especially children. 49 Occupiers may not
requisition food except for use by the force of occupation and then only
after the requirements of the civilian population have been considered. 50 Yet
these rules do not address whether neutral States that rely on a belligerent
State for its food supply are entitled to access that agricultural produce as a
matter of right.
Like all military operations, whether Russian efforts to disrupt access by
foreign shipping to Ukrainian agricultural exports are derived from a maritime exclusion zone or blockade against Odessa, they are subject to military
necessity, proportionality, and distinction. Military actions by Russia to deprive Ukrainian forces of food are subject to the rule of proportionality in
jus in bello. States must “refrain from attacks in which the expected harm
incidental to such attacks would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated to be gained.” 51 Belligerents must distinguish between food that sustains the enemy force, which may be a lawful
military objective, and food that sustains the civilian population, which is
not. The U.S. view on distinction in this context is that “an attack by any means
against crops intended solely for consumption by noncombatants not contributing to the enemy’s war effort would be unlawful for such would not be

45. See OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF
WAR MANUAL § 17.9.2 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016).
46. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 5(1)(b), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
47. Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art 26, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
48. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art.
89, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV];
Convention No. V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in
Case of War of Land art. 12, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540.
49. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 48, arts. 50, 55.
50. Id. art. 55.
51. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 45, § 2.4.1.2.
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an attack upon a legitimate military objective.” 52 In the present case, however, the direction of the harm inflicted flows to foreign civilian populations
at risk of starvation.
While neutral States may continue to trade with belligerents, this right
extends only to the protection of neutral commerce in situ and not a right of
access to a belligerent port situated in a zone of conflict. Hence, there is no
neutral right per se to enter a Ukrainian port in safety and onload cargo.
Secretary-General António Guterres is leading a diplomatic effort involving
Russia, Turkey, and other States to resume Ukrainian grain shipments. Guterres suggested Russia permit Ukrainian grain shipments in exchange for
easing sanctions against Russian and Belarusian exports of potash fertilizer. 53
So far, however, Russia seems not to be negotiating in earnest, and no resolution is in sight. 54

52. J. Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel, Department of Defense, Letter to Chairman
Fulbright, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Apr. 5, 1971, 10 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1300, 1302 (1971), quoted in LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 45, at 292
n.612.
53. See Gabriela Galindo, Why the E.U.’s Potash Sanctions Are Looming Over Supermarket
Prices, POLITICO (Mar. 4, 2022, 12:29 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-sanctionshigher-food-prices-potash/.
54. See Mauldin, supra note 3.
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